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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes to argue that ecological justice that is rooted in an ecocentric approach to nature is the key to 
achieving integral human development which goes beyond ‘development that is only worth our while’. 
Ecological justice is achievable if there is a clear understanding of relations at two distinct levels - one, the 
relation among humans and another between the entire human community and other elements of the ecosystem. 
These relations are the basis of the alliances that we form to address issues of integral human development. The 
focus of the paper is the second kind of alliance that is based on an understanding of the relation between the 
human and the non-human realm. However, an ‘alliance’ is normally formed between partners with equal 
standing. Is there a sense in which both humans and the non-human world can be considered to be ‘equal partners 
in an alliance? The paper considers how one might establish this by examining diverse philosophical viewpoints 
that have addressed the issue of the treatment of non-human animals for anthropocentric ends. It discusses 
whether equality between parties is necessary for the formation of an alliance drawing extensively from ethical 
theories and examples from the world. From rights approach, recipients of justice, to care ethics, several theories 
offer guidance to support what would constitute a ‘humane’ approach to non-human animals. While these 
approaches crucially pin the broad perspective, they have not explicitly considered the role of an alliance between 
humans and non-human animals in achieving a basic level of wellbeing for the latter. Taking cues from the 
different kinds of ‘ruling over’ from Stuart Gray’s understanding of the relation between humans and non-human 
nature, the paper seeks to establish that an alliance between humans and the non-human realm is possible even 
without committing to their equal status and this could form the basis of ecological justice and well-being. 
Keywords: environmental justice, integral human development, ecological justice, alliance beyond the human 
realm, ruling over nature 
 
RESUME 
Cet article défend l’idée que la justice écologique enracinée dans une approche écocentrique de la nature est la clé 
du développement humain intégral et dépasse le "développement qui ne vaut que pour nous". La justice 
écologique est réalisable s'il existe une compréhension claire des relations à deux niveaux distincts - l'un, la 
relation entre les humains et l'autre entre la communauté humaine tout entière et les autres éléments de 
l'écosystème. Ces relations constituent la base des alliances que nous formons pour résoudre les problèmes de 
développement humain intégral. Cet article est axé sur le deuxième type d’alliance qui repose sur la 
compréhension de la relation entre le monde humain et le monde non humain. Cependant, une alliance est 
normalement formée entre des partenaires de rang égal. Y a-t-il un sens dans lequel les humains et le monde non 
humain peuvent être considérés comme des partenaires égaux dans une alliance? L’article examine comment on 
pourrait établir cela en examinant divers points de vue philosophiques qui ont développé la question du traitement 
des animaux non humains à des fins anthropocentriques. Il aborde la question de savoir si l’égalité entre les parties 
est nécessaire à la formation d’une alliance reposant largement sur des théories éthiques et des exemples. De 
l’approche fondée sur les droits, en passant par l’éthique du care, plusieurs théories offrent des indications pour 
soutenir ce qui constituerait une approche humaine des animaux non humains. Bien que ces approches épousent de 
manière cruciale la perspective large, elles n’ont pas explicitement envisagé le rôle d’une alliance entre humains et 
animaux non humains dans l’atteinte d’un niveau de base de bien-être pour ces derniers. S'inspirant des différents 
types de décisions développées par Stuart Gray de la relation entre l'homme et la nature non humaine, l’article 
cherche à établir qu'une alliance entre l'homme et le monde non humain est possible, même sans s'engager à 
égalité de statut et cela pourrait constituer la base de la justice écologique et du bien-être. 
Mots-clés : Justice environnementale, développement humain intégral, justice écologique, alliance au-delà du 
domaine humain, domination de la nature 
JEL Classification: I39 





The paper begins with an assumption that human development is desirable in a very 
innocuous sense.
1
 Further, the paper also assumes that only that development is desirable 
which is fair, making it what Peter Penz (et. al) ( 2011) have termed as ‘worthwhile 
development’ in the light of the seven parameters mentioned by them. If we sum up the 
values that Penz (et. al) list as parameters of ‘worthwhile development’ then it would not be 
an exaggeration to say that a society that aims for ‘worthwhile development’ in their sense, 
would also end up being a more environmentally ‘just’ society.  But what do we understand 
by ‘environmental justice in the first place? Is it all about conserving the environment even 
at the cost of harm to human welfare - the agenda of the ‘environmental fascists and 
misanthropic biocentrist’?
2
 Shrader-Frechette terms this approach environmentalism as 
against environmental justice (or injustice) which she understands in the context of 
distributive and participative justice (or injustice). In her words, “Environmental justice 
requires both a more equitable distribution of environmental goods and bads and greater 
public participation in evaluating and apportioning these goods and bads.” (2002:6). She also 
claims that “protection for people and the planet go hand in hand” (2002: 5) and that the two 
movements - environmentalism and environmental justice are “different sides of the same 
coin” (2002:6) such that a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of using natural 
resources would at the same time result in greater protection for the environment.  
Environmental justice understood in this sense is an anthropocentric understanding of justice 
that concerns itself predominantly with injustices caused by discriminatory practices of 
distribution and participation based on race, class, ethnicity, gender, or age. Important as this 
aspect of social justice is, it does not address the issues of the injustices and harm that we, 
the human community, cause or can cause to the environment (including animals and future 
generations) in our aspiration for development. In order to focus on this aspect of justice we 
need to go beyond Shrader-Frechette’s understanding of environmental justice and think of 
ecological justice which is based on the idea that each element of the ecosystem is regarded 
as equally important for the sustenance and well-being of the entire ecosystem. Ecological 
justice is “necessary for integral human development – the economic, political, social and 
spiritual well-being of every person...Ecological justice celebrates the interconnection and 
interdependence of all beings, and recognizes our human responsibility to coexist in 
harmony for the well-being of the Earth community. Ecological justice promotes human 
dignity, the self-determination of all persons, and the development of sustainable economies 
with justice for all within a finite world.”
3
.  
                                                 
1
Though, what would count as ‘development’ for humans, its scope and extent is undoubtedly a 
contestable subject especially in the face of an onslaught from the anti-development lobby. 
2
 Shrader-Frechette (2002) refers to the views of environmentalists like Dave Foreman, J. B. Calicott, 
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This paper proposes to argue that ecological justice that is rooted in an ecocentric approach 
to nature is the key to achieving integral human development which goes beyond 
‘development that is only worth our while’.  Ecological justice is achievable if there is a 
clear understanding of relations at two distinct levels - one the relation among humans and 
another between the entire human community and other elements of the ecosystem. These 
relations are the basis of the alliances that we form to address issues of human development 
and how they impact humans (both of the present and future generation) as well as the 
environment in general. However, when one talks of ‘alliances’ the more common form of 
alliance that comes to mind is that between international human agencies and organizations 
belonging to sovereign states all of which get together to address one or more global issue. 
Important as they are, the alliances amongst human communities must also extend beyond 
the human realm to the non-human realm; between humans and  the non-human animal 
world as well as the natural environment in general, specially when we address issues like 
human - animal conflict, extinction of rare species of flora and fauna, and animals as well as 
human and environmental calamities caused by climate change. The paper argues for a non-
anthropocentric alliance between the human and the non-human realm in addition to the 
alliance among human communities to achieve the same purpose of ecological well-being 
and ecological justice. It also attempts to show that the second kind of alliance (between 




In considering the alliance beyond the human realm, interesting philosophical issues arise. 
For example, in the first kind of alliance, i.e., among humans, every allying member is 
supposedly an equal partner and purportedly gains from the alliance, whereas in the second 
kind, the alliance beyond the human realm, the gain is one-sided. It is true that when the 
allying partners are  more ‘equal’ we can expect more justice to all stakeholders; when they 
are not, injustices may result. So this raises the question - ‘Is there a sense in which both 
humans and the non-human world can be considered to be ‘equal partners in an alliance’? - a 
presumption that would be implied by any ecocentric conception of justice. But again, must 
an alliance always be amongst equals in order for it to be fair thereby promoting justice?  
These two questions will be taken up in the concluding part of the paper based on the 
deliberations through the paper. For this purpose, I draw upon the views of both western and 
non-western philosophers, ancient and modern, to put forth the idea of an alliance that goes 
beyond the human realm. The aim is to understand the nature of the alliance beyond the 
human realm that will protect the interests of both humans and the environment and help to 
achieve ecological well being and ecological justice 
                                                 
4
 In this paper, I am not looking at the political alliances amongst sovereign states and international 
organizations to save the earth from climate change disasters and environmental degradation, for 
example; these may be important but what is more fundamental is the understanding, the eco-dialogue 
that human communities can have to understand the alliance between the human and the non-human 
realm. 
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1. ANIMAL ‘RIGHTS’ AND ‘NEEDS’: AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC APPROACH 
TO JUSTICE 
In the traditional western discourse on the relation between humans and non-human nature, 
starting from Aristotle to Kant, and the rationalists in general, the overriding sentiment was 
that all human beings are equal in their ‘humanity’ by virtue of their rational nature. Further, 
being human was the quality that accounted for the moral status of humans distinguishing 
them from amoral non-human animals. Being human was also the basis for ‘human rights’ 
which served as effective means of bringing about social justice. On the other hand, non-
human animals and nature in general was treated merely as an instrument of human use and 
need, bereft of any moral status and of rights. This attitude  resulted in growing injustices 
towards animals and degradation of nature at large. Philosophers  like Peter Singer  (1999) 
and Tom Regan (1999) are, perhaps, the first philosophers in recent times to have argued for 
the rights of animals thereby attributing equal status to both human and non-human animals 
in a very basic sense.  The difference amongst most philosophers who are willing to ascribe 
some rights to animals is regarding the question - where should one draw the moral boundary 
and on what grounds? Whereas Regan champions animal rights based on a rights theory, 
Singer’s approach for the moral considerability of animals is utilitarian and based on the 
principle of equal consideration of interests.
 
For Singer, ‘sentience’ (experience) is the limit 
beyond which rights cannot be conceptually granted to  elements of nature and he  is hesitant 
to extend rights to vegetative life, because in his opinion there is not enough evidence to 
suggest that trees or ecosystems possess consciousness.  
Though one may grant that extending the concept of rights to animals has brought about a 
sea change in our treatment of animals, the concept of ‘rights’ and the co-relative notion of  
duties  that humans owe to animals (if there are any), are philosophically loaded concepts for 
one to resolve the issue in any simple way. Criticising the rights approach, Ted Benton 
(1993) remarks,  
“... the case for attributing rights to non-human animals faces severe intellectual 
obstacles, their ‘neediness’ as natural beings is a feature shared with human 
animals. Moreover, a needs-based view of justice has the further advantage of 
extending the scope of cross-species moral concern beyond the narrow circle of 
species whose individuals satisfy [Tom] Regan’s subject-of-life criterion. Need 
understood in terms of conditions necessary for living-well or flourishing is a 
concept applicable not only to all animal species,but to plant-life as well” (Benton 
1993: 212). 
According to Benton, human and non-human animals have the same needs which makes 
them equal in a very basic sense. Emphasizing another aspect of naturalism Benton 
says,“One aspect of human embodiment - our requirement for food- engages us in social 
relations and practices which inescapably include animals: as partners in human labour, as 
objects of labour, and of consumption, as well as competitors for habitats and common 
sources of food” (1993: 18). He further adds that “[I]f animal husbandry is tolerable at all, 
these considerations tell in favour of husbandry regimes which preserve opportunities for 
animals to establish and maintain the broad patterns of social life which are peculiar to their 
species. Where physical and psychological development requires more-or-less prolonged 
relationships between juvenile animals and adults, conditions for these relationships need to 
Beyond the Human Realm 
50 
 
be provided” (1993:172). This approach to animals emphasizes the fact that human lifestyles 
need to change to the extent where any ‘over indulgence’ on the part of humans would cause 
harm to the wellbeing of animals on whom we are dependent in numerous ways. The well-
being of animals becomes important but only insofar as humans are dependent on animals 
not so much for their own sake. Although such an attitude towards animals would help in 
bringing about desirable results, it is still a very anthropocentric approach.  
Andrew Dobson (1998) talks of how one may consider humans and animals to be equal. He 
distinguishes between ‘dispensers of justice’ and ‘recipients of justice’ in the context of a 
theory of distributive justice and argues that animals (as well as future generations of people) 
may not be dispensers of justice but they can be said to be recipients of justice (1998: 65). If 
it is in the interest of an animal to strive for its well-being (even if limited to basic needs and 
the instinctive behaviour of survival) it is still a recipient of justice. It follows that if certain 
human actions can cause harm to this striving to live “well” then these actions would count 
as being unjust to the animal. There have been many instances where aspirations for human 
development have harmed the wellbeing of animals, for example, the case where the Atomic 
Energy Commission of USA  had conducted two atomic bomb tests in Canada in 1953 which 
resulted in the death of hundreds of sheep that were the victims of the nuclear fallout. 
(Shrader-Frechette , 2002: 189). This is clearly a case of injustice caused to animals on 
account of humans. As an entity that can be a recipient of justice, it would be wrong/ unjust 
on the part of humans to inflict harm to it. In this innocuous sense of ‘recipients of justice’ 
we can avoid the controversies about rights claims, duties, obligation, etc. and simply say 
that both humans and animals need to be treated equally justly since both have an interest in 
their own well-being - both are recipients of justice, though humans are also dispensers of 
justice.  
The notion of justice that comes across for the non-human world when we adopt the rights, 
or needs approach to understand the relation between the human and non-human world is 
anthropocentric as is evident from the fact that the animal rights activists draw boundaries of 
moral considerability leaving out non-sentient beings and the needs approach also rests on 
the utility value of animals for fulfilling human needs of food, labour etc. Dobson’s 
‘recipients of justice’ status to animals as well as humans, fails to specify how the interests 
of humans (both of the present and future generation) stack up against the interests of 
animals when these are in conflict. Though Dobson does give an elaborate account of the 
priorities, the basis of those priorities is not clear (Dobson 1998 : 33-61). It is the care ethics 
approach which goes beyond anthropocentrism and appeals to the notion of ecological 
justice to understand better the relation between the two realms. This is also to be found in 
many non-western cultures both ancient and modern.       
3. DIMENSIONS OF CARE : MOVING TOWARDS AN ECOCENTRIC 
APPROACH TO JUSTICE  
Val Plumwood (1999), a staunch believer of ecocentrism and a relentless critic of 
anthropocentrism talks of alliances between human and nature. Criticising ethicists 
(including Singer), who have drawn moral boundaries that distinguish humans as rights 
holders from the ‘others’ that cannot be ascribed rights, Plumwood is of the view that 
drawing a moral boundary creates power relations which treat those beyond the moral 
boundary only instrumentally. She argues that rather than extending the boundary to include 
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some animals we should stop thinking in terms of boundaries since it creates polarities in an 
‘all-or-nothing’ way. Arguing for a ‘care ethic’ approach, Plumwood says that care “can be 
applied to humans and also to non-human animals and nature more generally” and further 
that “ethically relevant qualities such as mind, communication, consciousness and sensitivity 
to others are organized in multiple and diverse ways across life forms that do not correspond 
to the all-or-nothing scenarios assumed by moral dualism” (1999: 191).  In her opinion, the 
“rationalistic economic calculus which divorces ‘rational’ and ‘efficient’ political and 
economic life from care, compassion, social and ecological responsibility is the ultimate 
modern expression of the West’s ancient rationalist opposition between reason and emotion, 
male and female, culture and nature, in which it has now ensnared the entire globe and all its 
species” (1999:206).  
The care ethic approach to the human and non-human world has always been the hallmark of 
most non-western ancient philosophies like Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism to 
mention a few. The idea of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’(the idea of the entire ecosystem as a 
‘family’ where each member is to be treated with mutual respect, care and recognition) 
pervades the entire ancient Indian philosophical tradition, barring the materialist Carvaka 
philosophy. The same idea can be drawn from the macro and microcosm view about the 
world expressed in the phrase - yathā pinḍe, tathā brahmānḍe ( the macrocosm is a organic 
whole like the microcosm) - a pervasive thought common to Hindu philosophy. Interestingly 
one could argue for the same cordial relation from the point of view of Buddhist metaphysics 
and ethics also.  If the theory of ‘kamma’(action) and rebirth as propounded by Buddhism is 
to be believed, and if one’s actions in the present life determine what ‘species status’ one 
would have in subsequent births in order to bear out the fruits of past actions, it is in the self-
interest of a person to do good deeds, including treating nature (animals) with compassion 
(karuna). Such a ‘holistic’ approach to the relation between humans and the cosmic world, 
seeped in metaphysical views transcending species and boundaries of the present generation 
of humans and animals expresses a ecocentric conception of both well-being and justice.   
The writings of Vandana Shiva have also emphasized the importance of conceiving the 
human and non-human world in the light of ethical teachings from ancient Indian 
philosophy. In her book Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in an Age of Climate Crisis 
(2008), Shiva has emphasized the “ecological path of living with justice and sustainability”. 
Citing ancient Indian philosophical sources, she maintains that “right living” consists in 
following “dharma” which can be construed as the bridge between resources (artha) and 
human needs (kama) and which secures the balance between the two. Dharma is also 
regarded as the all-pervading principle of social and moral order in Indian philosophy. In 
Shiva’s view, the global economy has created an “ecological imbalance” due to a conflict 
between “economic laws” on the one hand and “ecological laws” and “social laws” on the 
other. This imbalance has also led to a non-sustainable paradigm of equity where everyone 
has an equal right to pollute and deplete earth’s resources whereas what we need is a 
sustainable paradigm of equity which recognizes the equal responsibility not to do that.  
Shiva discusses the concept of ‘Earth Democracy’ and states, “Earth Democracy begins and 
ends with Gaia’s laws - the law of renewability, the law of conservation, the law of entropy, 
the law of diversity. In Earth Democracy, all beings and all peoples are equal, and all beings 
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and all communities have rights to the resources of the earth for their sustenance.”
5
 This is 
yet another sense in which one can conceive of the equality of human and non-human 
elements of nature thereby facilitating a more just and fair ecological order.  
However, even if humans and the non-human world are not equals, one can envisage a 
relation between them based on the sentiments of care and obligations ensuing from the 
power equation between them.  Amartya Sen (2010) drawing from the teachings of Gautam 
Buddha in the Sutta-Nipata
6
 discusses the asymmetrical relation between humans and nature 
and emphasizes the obligations of power or privilege that ensue from it.  Where one party is 
more ‘powerful’ there is more responsibility on that party to fulfill the obligations it owes by 
virtue of the power/privileges it enjoys. Buddha argues that “since we are enormously more 
powerful than other species, we have some responsibility towards other species that connects 
exactly with this asymmetry of power”. (as quoted in Sen 2010: 205) The argument can be 
stated as follows: “if some action that can be freely undertaken is open to a person (thereby 
making it feasible), and if the person assesses that undertaking of that action will create a 
more just situation in the world (thereby making it justice-enhancing), then that is argument 
enough for the person to consider seriously what he or she should do in view of these 
recognitions”(Sen 2010: 206). The argument reinforces Dobson’s view that as the exclusive 
dispensers of justice, human beings have obligations towards non-human nature to treat it 
with justice too. An argument along similar lines can also be offered towards an equitable 
solution to the issue of climate justice with regard to allocation of future carbon credits to 
developed and developing nations. If developed countries are in a position of taking actions 
(making lifestyle changes) because of their more powerful/privileged position then a policy 
decision (settling for fewer carbon credits) on their part would enable a more just situation 
globally. They would be fulfilling  greater responsibility because of their greater ability to 
respond to that situation. The concept of human moral obligation (the obligations that 
humans have towards themselves as well as other non-human elements of nature) is a 
powerful concept that can be exploited to establish an amicable relation among humans and 
between human and non-human elements of nature. (Motilal 2015: 1-24)   
In recent times, there has been a significant revival of some indigenous approaches to the 
human-nature relationship in Latin America that have impacted the public policy and 
developmental agenda of countries like Ecuador
 
and Bolivia, among others.  Two bionomic 
concepts prevail in this new approach - Pachmama (a holistic notion of the world) and 





According to Ronel Alberti da Rosa (2015), the new Latin American national constitutions 
made a paradigm shift from the rights of the homo econimicus of the period of Industrial 
                                                 
5
 Quote is from an Excerpt from Shiva (2008) in Alternatives Journal, 35:3, 2009. p.22 
6
Reference found in Amartya Sen (2010) footnote 6 in Chapter 9: Plurality of Impartial Reasons. 
Footnote 6: The classic English translation of Sutta Nipata can be found in F.Max Muller (ed.), The 
Sacred Books of the East, vol.X, Part II, The Sutta-Nipata: A Collection of Discourses, translated by 
V. Fausboll (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881). A later translation is The Sutta-Nipata, translated by H. 
Saddhatissa (London: Curzon Press, 1985) 
7
 The word comes from the extinct kolla language spoken in the Inca Empire. 
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Revolution to a new paradigm that “tries to mediate the coexistence of three players that 
interact and establish a sort of moral pyramid: rational animals, irrational animals and the 
Pachmama.” (2015: 77) He further says, “ The Pachmama, as a kind of indigenous pantheist 
being, includes humans, their culture and science and all elements of the natural world, i.e., 
the non-rational world. The Pachmama has the role of regulating the communal life of 





The concept of Sumak Kawsay or Good Life  has been widely discussed as an alternative to 
capitalist development and the possible principle of a new way of understanding the 
economy. It heralded a “new paradigm of development for Latin America” (Ramírez 2010: 5 
as mentioned in Altmann 2014: 82) or a “biocentric turn” (Hernández 2009: 62 as mentioned 
in Altmann 2014: 82). Good Life was understood as “Living mostly in harmony and 
equilibration with one self, with the community and with the cosmos” (GTZ 2002: 24 as 
mentioned in Altmann 2014: 86)  - a thought that resonates well with the idea of ‘vasudhaiv 
kutumbakam’. “Good life means a way of living that tries to adapt to its environment. It 
refers to a reconstruction of indigenous principles, adopting them to actual and future 
realities but always based on the local community and its autonomy” (Viteri 2002: 5 as 
mentioned in Altmann 2014: 87). According to Altmann, “the Good Life as a central concept 
amongst others makes ecological aspects of the economy an important matter and provides a 
conceptual weapon to fight  not only exploitation and oppression, but also a way of life that 
does not allow a harmony inside society and between society and nature” (2014: 91).   
 
4. LIVING IN HARMONY WITH & LIVING IN HARMONY FOR 
In understanding the relation that underlies the nature of the alliance between human and the 
nonhuman world one can draw useful insights from the work of Stuart Gray (2017), who has 
looked at this relation from the lens of cross-cultural interconnectedness. He is of the view 
that we need to “identify traditions and vocabularies that can provide broader historical and 
cultural perspective and thus leverage, for critical dialogue on issues of shared concern 
across national boundaries” (2017: 223). This is important since ‘dialogue’ is the basic 
foundation of an ‘alliance’ among humans and cross-cultural ecological dialogue can surely 
form the starting point on which sovereign states can enter into alliances to save the planet.  
In Gray’s view, the traditional understanding of the relation between human and nonhuman 
nature is that of ruling over - where humans rule over nature. The human-centric 
understanding of ruling is ruling over nonhuman nature and ruling with human elements, 
neglecting what he calls the “connectedness of rule that fundamentally links human and 
nonhuman interests”. Explaining this connectedness he talks of a polycentric polytemporal 
conception of the self where one’s “identity is intertwined with the geographic location in 
which one lives, the region’s climate, loved ones, workplace and co-workers, pets, garden, 
                                                 
8
 In Ronel Alberti da Rosa’s view, the eudaemonic analogue to the concept of the Good Life can be 
found in the form of sumak kawsay in the Quechua language, and other forms among several 
indigenous cultures of Latin America. 
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electronic devices, and so on”. He talks of the “co-constitutive nature of polycentric identity 
and the multi-dimensionality of the world in which we are porosly embedded”.
9
  
Gray distinguishes four aspects of ruling which are: 
1. Ruling over ( the traditional relation between human and nature where the latter is 
only an instrument of use) 
2. Ruling with ( alliances amongst humans based on democratic principles) 
3. Ruling for (where the ruler rules for all not just for human beings a form of 
panocracy)  
4. Ruling in a broader network of human and non-human nature. 
 
The relation of ‘ruling’ in this expanded sense (including ruling-with, ruling-for and ruling-
in the interest of nonhuman nature) is opposed to the merely ‘instrumental’ use made by the 
ruling-over paradigm. Nevertheless, it still remains an anthropocentric approach since it 
relies on the idea of rule and rulers and only humans can be rulers. Perhaps a better way to 
understand the relation among humans, and that between humans and nature (and thereby the 
alliances based on these relations), is to define them in terms of the idea of ‘living in 
harmony’ - ‘living in harmony with’ and ‘living for the harmony of’. ‘Living in harmony’ is 
the essential idea in the various non-anthropocentric approaches to justice that were outlined 
in the paper and it is at the core of ecological justice. Thus, we have to do away with the 
concept of ‘ruling over’ and replace it with the concept of ‘living in harmony with other 
humans’, and ‘living for the harmony of the ecosystem’. The first will ensure harmony 
amongst human communities in achieving social justice in all its forms (including 
environmental justice as understood by Shrader -Frechette) and the second will protect the 
entire ecosystem of which humans are a part. Both these aspects of justice are captured in the 
idea of ‘ecological justice’ as defined earlier.  
Aspiring for ecological justice is not an attitude of anti-development. It seeks to understand 
human development as integral and sustainable human development where sustainable is 
understood as sustainable for the harmonious existence of the entire ecosystem and not 
merely the existence of the human race. Human development must be evaluated by this 
parameter and not merely by an anthropocentric notion of justice.  
5. CONCLUSION 
It appears that it is the relationship between humans and nature that really defines the nature 
of the alliance between the two. But, in such an alliance, there is no room for ruling over 
nature. It is precisely for this reason that we may legitimately call this an ‘alliance’ where the 
allying partners are ‘equal’ in all the senses that were culled from the western and non-
western approaches to the relation between humans and non-human elements of nature.  It is 
                                                 
9
 Raimundo Pannikar expresses the same sentiment when he says,”The individual is just an 
abstraction, i.e., a selection of a few aspects of the person for practical purposes. My person, on the 
other hand, is also in “my” parents, children, friends, foes, ancestors and successors. “My” person is 
also in “my” ideas and feelings and in “my” belongings.”  (1982: 90) 
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not a contract to be fulfilled by terms and conditions to which all parties agree. It is an 
understanding that humans have about the interconnectedness and continuum between 
humans and other elements of nature. It is a sense of ‘our being with nature’ which is 
pervasive in nature. And this sense is not necessarily a conscious awareness of our need for 
nature and to live with nature, rather it is our sense of wanting to live in harmony with 
nature. It is our response-ability (our ability to respond) that connects with nature for our 
own sake as well as for its sake.  
But, again to press the point about ‘alliances’ a bit more, one can argue that even if the 
allying partners are not equal there may still be an alliance between them.  More often it is 
their mutual interest in a higher goal to be achieved through that alliance that brings them 
together, albeit all parties in the alliance are aware and desire the goal to be achieved. This 
would be characteristic of the alliance among humans in diverse societies/ sovereign states 
that would be needed to solve global environmental problems like climate justice. Such an 
alliance is formal and to be maintained or ‘played by the rules of the game’.  However, as 
Sen has remarked “[M]utual benefit, based on symmetry and reciprocity, is not the only 
foundation for thinking about reasonable behaviour towards others. Having effective power 
and the obligations that can follow unidirectionally from it can also be an important basis for 
impartial reasoning, going well beyond the motivation of mutual benefits.” (Sen 2010: 207) 
The ‘alliance beyond the human realm’ is to be understood in this sense where even if the 
allying partners are not equal, considerations of care, justice, respect and rights of nature can 
all constitute ‘reasonable behaviour’ and ‘impartial reasoning’ vis-a-vis nature. In this 
respect, our ways could be different but our goal is the same - A World United for 
Ecological Justice!  
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